

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 EURE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00

NSCE-00 SSO-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 PM-05 H-01 INR-07

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CU-04 BIB-01 IO-13 CA-01 EB-08 DHA-05 OMB-01

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FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3093

INFO AMEMBASSY BERLIN

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 BELGRADE 7349

FOR EUR/RPM AND EUR/SOV FROM USDEL CSCE

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: CSCE, OCON

SUBJECT: BELGRADE CSCE -- BREZHNEV CMB PROPOSALS

REF: BELGRADE 7265

1. THIS CABLE CONTAINS OUR INITIAL VIEWS ABOUT HOW WE

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SHOULD DEAL WITH THE BREZHNEV CBM PROPOSAL, UNVEILED

IN OCTOBER 21 SPEECH, TO PUT A CEILING ON THE SIZE OF

MANEUVERS AND HIS PROMISE OF SOVIET SYMPATHY SHOULD THE

COUNTRIES OF THE SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN WISH CMBS TO BE

EXTENDED THEM. AS ALREADY REPORTED (REFTEL) BOTH OF THESE

IDEAS WERE INCLUDED IN THE SOVIET "PROGRAM OF ACTION"

TO PROMOTE MILITARY DETENTE INTRODUCED IN BOTH PLENARY AND

BASKET I SUBSIDIARY WORKING BODY OCTOBER 24. PROGRAM ALSO INCLUDED OLD NON-FIRST-USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (NFU) AND PACT-MEMBERSHIP-FREEZE PROPOSALS, AS WELL AS STATEMENT DRAWN FROM BREZHNEV OCTOBER 21 SPEECH ACKNOWLEDGING CONTRIBUTION OF CMB'S TO CONFIDENCE AND MILITARY DETENTE AND CALLING FOR THEIR CONSISTENT IMPLEMENTATION.

2. NATO CBM'S CAUCUS HAS SCHEDULED MORNING MEETING OCTOBER 26 TO DISCUSS SOVIET INITIATIVE, PARTICULARLY PROPOSAL TO PUT A CEILING ON MANEUVER SIZE. IN OPENING DISCUSSION OF CBM'S IN SUBSIDIARY WORKING BODY, SEVERAL NATO REPS, BY PRE-ARRANGEMENT, WELCOMED SOVIET PLENARY STATEMENT AS EVIDENCE OF SOVIET INTEREST IN IMPROVING IMPLEMENTATION OF CMB'S. WE NOTED WE WOULD STUDY BREZHNEV PROPOSAL AND EXPECTED, IN TURN, THAT PRES. CARTER'S UN PROPOSALS ON DISARMAMENT WOULD ALSO BE STUDIED. WE AVOIDED SUBSTANTIVE COMMENT ON THE BREZHNEV PROPOSAL, HOWEVER. PENDING INSTRUCTIONS FROM CAPITALS, WE BELIEVE IT IS IMPORTANT THAT NATO ALLIES, WHILE CONTINUING TO WELCOME SOVIET RECOGNITION OF VALUE OF CBM'S AND INTEREST IN THEIR IMPLEMENTATION, SHOULD DO NOTHING TO INDICATE THAT PROPOSAL TO LIMIT MANEUVER SIZE MIGHT PROVIDE USEFUL BASIS FOR SERIOUS DISCUSSION. WE ALSO BELIEVE WE AND OUR ALLIES SHOULD LEAVE NO DOUBT IN CORRIDOR DISCUSSIONS ABOUT THE ONE-SIDED NATURE OF THE PROPOSAL. WE PLAN TO MAKE THESE POINTS IN THE NATO CAUCUS.

3. LOOKING AHEAD TO WHAT WE MIGHT SAY ABOUT THE PROPOSAL
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WHEN THE TIME COMES TO ADDRESS IT IN DETAIL, AND ASSUMING DEPARTMENT WILL CONFIRM OUR ASSESSMENT THAT IT IS NOT ACCEPTABLE, EVEN AS A STARTING POINT FOR SERIOUS NEGOTIATION, WE WOULD CONSIDER MAKING SOME OR ALL OF THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

A. THE PROPOSAL IS CLEARLY ONE-SIDED. IT WOULD REQUIRE A CHANGE IN NATO PRACTICE BUT NOT IN THAT OF THE WARSAW PACT. WHILE NATO SOMETIMES CONDUCTS MANEUVERS INVOLVING MORE THAN 50-60 THOUSAND TROOPS, THE WARSAW PACT DOES NOT. THE PACT INSTEAD CONDUCTS MOST OF ITS FIELD TRAINING EXERCISES AT THE DIVISION LEVEL AND BELOW. AT THE SAME TIME THE PACT HOLDS MANY MORE COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS EXERCISES THAN DOES NATO; THESE INCLUDE EXERCISES AT THE FRONT AND ARMY LEVEL, WHICH, IF CONDUCTED WITH ACTUAL DEPLOYMENT OF THE TROOPS NOTIONALLY INVOLVED, WOULD RIVAL THE NATO MANEUVERS IN SIZE. THESE DIFFERENCES IN PRACTICE REFLECT THE DIFFERING APPROACHES OF THE TWO ALLIANCES TO ASSURING THE PREPAREDNESS OF THEIR FORCES. (IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE SOME BACKGROUND ON WHY NATO MUST CONDUCT MANEUVERS ON THE SCALE IT DOES. ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT THINK WE SHOULD LET OURSELVES BE DRAWN INTO DETAILED DISCUSSION OF NATO PRACTICES AND THEIR RATIONALES, IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE SOME BACKGROUND INFORMATION TO DRAW UPON SELECTIVELY AS REQUIRED. IF THE DIFFERENCES IN THE EXERCISE

PRACTICES OF THE TWO ALLIANCES ARE A FUNCTION OF THEIR CONTRASTING POSTURES--THE ONE OFFENSIVE, THE OTHER DEFENSIVE--THIS WOULD OF COURSE BE IMPORTANT FOR US TO KNOW.)

B. GIVEN ITS ONE-SIDED CHARACTER AND THE FACT THAT IT WOULD IN NO WAY AFFECT WARSAW PACT PRACTICES, IT IS DIFFICULT TO VIEW THIS AS A SERIOUS PROPOSAL. THE IMPRESSION OF OPPORTUNISM IS REINFORCED WHEN ONE HEARS REPRESENTATIVES OF THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES TELL US, AS THE SOVIET AND CZECH REPS HAVE DONE, THAT IT IS TOO EARLY TO CONSIDER FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF CBMS.

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C. THE SOVIET PROPOSAL, EVEN IF IT WERE MORE BALANCED IN ITS FORMULATION, WOULD TAKE US CONCEPTUALLY BEYOND THE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES CONTAINED IN THE FINAL ACT. THE LATTER REQUIRE OR INVITE GREATER OPENNESS IN THE CONDUCT OF A STATE'S MILITARY ACTIVITIES, TO BE ACHIEVED THROUGH PRIOR NOTIFICATION, IN-

VITATION OF OBSERVERS, AND MILITARY EXCHANGES. THE SOVIET PROPOSAL, IN CONTRAST, WOULD PLACE A SPECIFIC RESTRICTION ON MILITARY ACTIVITY. SUCH RESTRICTIONS ARE THE PROPER SUBJECT OF ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN OPPOSING STATES
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AND ALLIANCES, IN WHICH QUESTION OF EQUITABLENESS AND VERIFIABILITY CAN BE EXPLORED AND NEGOTIATED IN DETAIL. THEY GO BEYOND WHAT CAN REASONABLY AND SERIOUSLY BE NEGOTIATED IN CSCE. THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS IN MBFR HAVE INTRODUCED A NUMBER OF SUCH RESTRICTIVE, OR STABILIZING, MEASURES IN THE NEGOTIATIONS IN VIENNA. IF THE SOVIET UNION IS SERIOUS ABOUT ITS PROPOSAL TO LIMIT THE SIZE OF MANEUVERS, WE WOULD URGE IT TO PRESENT THE PROPOSAL IN VIENNA AND NOT ATTEMPT TO PREJUDICE CONSIDERATION THERE BY SEEKING SOME FORM OF PRIOR BELGRADE ENDORSEMENT.

D. IN EXPLAINING ITS PROPOSAL, THE SOVIET UNION HAS ASSERTED THAT MANEUVERS AT THE 50-60,000 TROOP LEVEL "GIVE RISE TO SPECIAL APPREHENSION AND RESEMBLE MILITARY DEMONSTRATIONS." IN THIS CONTEXT, THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE IN THE SUBSIDIARY WORKING BODY REFERRED SPECIFICALLY TO MANEUVERS CONDUCTED ON THE TERRITORY OF STATES IN WESTERN EUROPE. WE WOULD LIKE TO ASK WHOM THESE MANEUVERS THREATEN. CERTAINLY NOT THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES. TO DISCOVER WHERE THE THREAT LIES, TO DISCOVER WHICH ALLIANCE IS ORGANIZED FOR DEFENSE AND WHICH FOR POSSIBLE OFFENSIVE ACTION, ONE HAS ONLY TO LOOK AT THE DISPARITY IN NUMBERS OF GROUND FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND MORE PARTICULARLY AT THE NEARLY THREE TO ONE DISPARITY IN TANKS, THE PRINCIPLE INSTRUMENT OF ATTACK IN GROUND WARFARE.

4. SOMEWHAT MORE DIFFICULT TO DEAL WITH MIGHT BE A SOVIET FALLBACK POSITION, PROPOSING A TROOP CEILING FOR MANEUVERS (SAY 100,000) WHICH WOULD NOT IMPINGE UPON CURRENT NATO PRACTICE OR SUGGESTING A MORE GENERAL PROPOSITION THAT STATES UNDERTAKE TO AVOID CONDUCTION MANEUVERS OF A SIZE WHICH MIGHT "GIVE RISE TO SPECIAL APPREHENSIONS AND RESEMBLE MILITARY DEMONSTRATIONS." WE WOULD ENVISAGE CONTINUING TO ARGUE, PER PARA 2C ABOVE, THAT CONSIDERATION OF SUCH A PROPOSAL WOULD
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BE OUT OF PLACE IN CSCE.

5. SINCE THE AMBIGUOUS SOVIET STATEMENT ABOUT EXTENDING CMBS TO THE MILITARY ACTIVITIES OF THE SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES IS HINGED UPON THE WISHES OF THOSE COUNTRIES, WE

SHOULD NOT HAVE TO SPEAK TO IT DIRECTLY OURSELVES, AT LEAST
FOR THE TIME BEING. WE MIGHT, HOWEVER, AT SOME POINT ASK THE
SOVIETS HOW THEY WOULD ENVISAGE IMPLEMENTING THEIR SUGGESTION
WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF CSCE SINCE WE ASSUME THAT THEY, LIKE US,
CONTINUE TO OPPOSE BRINGING THE NON-PARTICIPATING
MEDITERRANEAN STATES INTO CSCE.

6. WE WOULD APPRECIATE DEPARTMENT'S COMMENTS AND
SUGGESTIONS.
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